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Abstract

the provenance of state, but rather about a state change;
and b) it does not ask about state that currently exists, but
rather about state that existed in the past.
Some existing systems [1, 16] do retain certain provenance data about disappeared state and state changes; for
example, PASS [16] maintains versions of provenance,
and infers the causes for state changes by comparing old
and current versions. This is different from the property we have in mind. First, we want to explicitly capture causality: if a file A depends on a thousand other
files and one of these files, say B, is changed, we want
the provenance of the change in A to be attributed to the
change in B. Second, since one of our potential use cases
is forensics, we are interested in strong security guarantees, i.e., we would like provenance queries to be answerable even if an adversary is actively trying to cover his
traces. Provenance should be remain accessible even if
the adversary deletes telltale files, or even compromises
some of the nodes on which the provenance is stored.
In summary, we see the main challenges as follows:

In this paper, we explore the use of provenance for analyzing execution dynamics in distributed systems. We argue that provenance could have significant practical benefits for system administrators, e.g., for reasoning about
changes in a system’s state, diagnosing protocol misconfigurations, detecting intrusions, and pinpointing performance bottlenecks. However, to realize this vision, we
must revisit several aspects of provenance management.
As a first step, we present time-aware provenance (TAP),
an enhanced provenance model that explicitly represents
time, distributed state, and state changes. We outline
our research agenda towards developing novel query processing, languages, and optimization techniques that can
be used to efficiently and securely query time-aware
provenance, even in the presence of transient state or untrusted nodes.

1

Introduction

Provenance [2] has proven to be a versatile concept.
It has been successfully applied to a variety of areas [3, 4, 7, 16, 17, 19], and this paper proposes an addition to this list. We observe that, in the context of distributed systems, it is very common for system administrators to perform analysis tasks that essentially amount
to network provenance [21] queries. For example, they
might ask diagnostic queries to determine the root cause
of a malfunction [18], forensic queries to identify the
source of an intrusion [10], or profiling queries to find
the reason for suboptimal performance [20]. At the heart
of all these queries is a question about data flows across
nodes – in other words, a question about provenance.
Thus, we should be able to bring to bear many of the
techniques originally developed for provenance in other
domains.
Prior work [21] has provided initial evidence that one
can efficiently maintain and query provenance in distributed systems, even at Internet scale. However, to
support the full range of functionality required for analyzing distributed systems, we must still address several
open challenges. Consider a simple use case from Internet interdomain routing: a network operator wants to
investigate why his route to eBay changed from r1 to r2
a minute ago. Existing provenance systems cannot easily answer this question because it a) does not ask about

• Challenge #1: Transient and inconsistent state.
We need new techniques for maintaining and querying provenance, such that consistent and complete
query results are guaranteed despite network variability, such as instabilities or oscillations.
• Challenge #2: Explanations for state changes.
We need an efficient mechanism that can explain
not only why a certain datum exists, but also why
it has appeared, disappeared, or changed.
• Challenge #3: Security without trusted nodes.
We need a provenance system that can correctly
answer provenance queries even if an attacker has
managed to compromise some part of the system.
As a starting point, we introduce time-aware provenance
(TAP), a novel provenance model that addresses the first
two challenges. We also outline a research agenda towards addressing further aspects of provenance management in distributed systems. These include (1) new
provenance models and maintenance strategies for capturing the time, distribution, and causality of updates, (2)
novel query processing and optimization techniques for
efficiently and securely answering queries at scale, and
(3) provenance query languages that enable a declarative
specification of time and changes.
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Figure 1: An three-node example network. The best path between node a
and node c (highlighted) changes in
response to a topology change.
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INSERT(c, cost(@c,a,4), t3)

mc2@b

c
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DERIVE(c, minCost(@c,a,4), mc3, t3)

INSERT(b, mincost(@b,a,1), t2)

mc1@b

DERIVE(b, minCost(@b,a,1), mc3, t2)

link(@b,a,1)

……

Figure 2: Comparison between classical provenance (left) and time-aware
provenance (right). The tree on the left explains why the cheapest path from
c to a has cost 4; the tree on the right explains why the cost has changed
from 5 to 4. Message transmissions between nodes are indicated by a cloud.

Background

derived when S has a (possibly indirect) path to D with total cost C, which can either be a direct link (mc1) or a path
through another node Z (mc2). Rule mc3 aggregates all
paths with the same sources and destinations to compute
the minimal path cost. The protocol runs continuously,
and updates path costs as links appear or disappear.

To set the stage for our subsequent discussion, we first
describe a basic provenance model, which we will extend
in Section 3 to arrive at TAP.

2.1

DERIVE(b, cost(@c,a,4), mc2@b, t2)

INSERT(b, link(@b,c,3), t1)

System Model

2.2

We assume that the distributed system consists of a set of
nodes, and that the state of each node can be expressed
as a set of tuples (typically with fixed schemas). The
execution logic is encoded in a set of derivation rules
that specify how tuples can be derived from each other
or from base tuples, which correspond to inputs. For
simplicity, we will assume that the derivation rules are
explicit. This is the case, e.g., for systems that are written in a declarative language such as Network Datalog
(NDlog) [13]. However, TAP is not specific to NDlog
and can be applied to systems implemented using imperative languages.
As a concrete example, we show the rules for a very
simple routing protocol, M IN C OST 1 , that computes the
lowest cost between each pair of nodes in a network:

Network Provenance

Existing provenance models, e.g., the model in [2] and
[21], capture the dependencies between tuples in a graph
that consists of tuple vertices and rule execution vertices,
and in which the edges represent data flows. Decentralized models for distributed systems – also known as network provenance models – partition this graph in some
way, e.g., by the location specifiers, and store each partition on a different node.
Consider the execution of the M IN C OST protocol in
the three-node network that is shown in Figure 1. Initially, at time t1 , the system is in a quiescent state. Then,
at time t2 > t1 , a link with cost 1 is inserted between
nodes a and c, which changes the topology of the network. As a consequence, the cost of c’s cheapest path
to a changes from 5 to 4; however, due to communication delays, the change is not propagated to c until time
t3 > t2 . The left part of Figure 2 shows the provenance
of the resulting tuple mincost(@c,a,4), which is generated from rule mc3 at node c. It is based on the tuple
cost(@c,a,4), which corresponds to the path c-b-a.
This example illustrates two limitations of existing
network provenance systems. First, existing systems can
correctly answer provenance queries for the updated tuple once the system is in a stable state again (after time
t3 ); however, the answer to such a query can be incorrect or incomplete between t2 and t3 , when some
nodes have already received the update and others have
not. While inconsistencies due to transient state could

mc1 cost(@S,D,C) :- link(@S,D,C).
mc2 cost(@S,D,C) :- link(@Z,S,C1),
mincost(@Z,D,C2), C=C1+C2.
mc3 mincost(@S,D,MIN<C>) :- cost(@S,D,C).

Note particularly that the derivation rules include state
from different nodes. In NDlog, this is expressed with
the location specifier @, which is followed by the name
of the node on which the tuple resides. In this system, the
base tuple link(@S,D,C) exists if node S has a direct
link to node D with cost C. The tuple cost(@S,D,C) is
1 The M IN C OST protocol can be extended to specify more complex
routing protocols, such as distance-vector and path-vector.

2

Edges. In most existing provenance models, the edges
represent data flows. TAP’s provenance graph contains
these edges as well, but, in order to answer queries about
state changes, it additionally needs to capture a ‘causality flow’ between updates. In many cases, the two flows
are aligned, but there are cases where they differ. For example, if a primary-key constraint exists in the system,
the derivation of a tuple τ1 may cause the deletion of
a tuple τ2 that shares τ1 ’s primary key, even though no
data flows from τ1 to τ2 . A similar situation can occur
for other types of constraints, such as aggregation. To
represent such causality flows, TAP’s provenance graph
includes additional update edges.
The right part of Figure 2 contains an instance of such
an edge at the DELETE vertex of mincost(@c,a,5) (indicated by a dotted line). This deletion was caused by the
aggregation constraint, i.e., the minimal cost changed because a lower-cost path to node a became available.

be resolved by maintaining provenance in bi-temporal
databases [8, 11], we propose, in the next section, a
provenance model that inherently captures temporal information. Second, because causality2 is not explicitly
represented in the provenance graph, it is difficult to trace
a state change back to its root causes.

3

Time-aware Provenance

Time-aware provenance (TAP) addresses these limitations by adding the following two features: First, in addition to storing dependencies between tuples that currently exist, TAP also remembers dependencies between
tuples that existed at some point in the past, which enables TAP to provide consistent answers to provenance
queries even while the system is in a transient state. Second, TAP’s provenance model explicitly represents tuple
changes, as well as the dependencies between them.

Derivations. The TAP graph can be captured via
the evaluation of delta rules of the form action :event, conditions, . . .. These rules can be obtained by rewriting the original derivation rules, using standard techniques from incremental view maintenance [5]. Thus, it should be possible to leverage existing distributed query processing engines with only minor
changes. Briefly, for each derivation rule p :- p1 , p2 ,
. . . ,pn , we generate two delta rules for each predicate
pi – one for insertions and the other for deletions. The
rules are of the form 4p :- p1 , . . ., 4pi , . . ., pn .
The event (in this case, 4pi ) is represented as an INSERT
or DELETE vertex, the conditions (the other pk ) are represented as a sequence of INSERT (or DELETE) vertices that
support the existence of pk , and the action itself (4p) is
represented as a DERIVE or UNDERIVE. Each action then
in turn causes a new event.

Vertices. TAP’s provenance graph contains the following four types of vertices:
•

INSERT (n, τ, t) and DELETE(n, τ, t): Tuple τ was inserted (deleted) on node n at time t;
• DERIVE(n, τ, R, t) and UNDERIVE(n, τ, R, t): Tuple
τ was derived (underived) via derivation rule R on
node n at time t.

The right half of Figure 2 shows a piece of the TAP
graph that would have been generated in the example
scenario from Section 2.2. Overall, the graph shows that
the tuple mincost(@c,a,5) was deleted on node c at
time t3 because the new link a-c was inserted at time
t1 . For example, the node DERIVE(mc2@b) shows that
cost(@c,a,4) was derived on node b at time t2 (and
subsequently sent to node c) because a) a link b-c with
cost three already existed at time t2 (since its insertion at
time t1 ), and b) the tuple mincost(@b,a,1) was newly
derived at t2 via rule mc3. Note that, among the immediate predecessors of a DERIVE (or UNDERIVE) vertex, the
INSERT (or DELETE) with the most recent timestamp is
the event that triggered the rule. The latter derivation was
caused by the insertion of the base tuple link(@b,a,1),
which corresponds to the addition of the new link.
Interestingly, the additional time dimension on the
provenance graph enables another use of provenance,
namely querying the effects of a state change. For example, if we want to determine how the insertion of the
new link a-b has affected the system, we can simply locate the corresponding INSERT vertex in the graph and
and traverse the edges in the reverse direction.

4

Provenance Maintenance

The graph representation of TAP can be stored in relational tables in a format similar to that in [21]. Each vertex can be maintained as a tuple according to the schema
presented in Section 3, along with an additional attribute
that stores the (potentially distributed) pointers to its direct contributing vertices.
In theory, the additional time dimension could be implemented by performing provenance versioning, i.e., by
keeping a copy of the provenance tables whenever the
data dependencies change. However, the storage cost
would be enormous, especially in distributed systems
that run for a long time with continuous updates. We
discuss three alternative approaches that are likely to be
more efficient; each comes with its own set of tradeoffs.

2 Note that TAP’s concept of causality is typically referred to as
data lineage in the database literature. Our notion of causality differs from [14, 15], which take the lineage information to infer ‘actual’
contributions of base tuples to the query results.

3

4.1

Three approaches

logs. The latter reduces the computational cost because
replay only needs to incrementally apply the changes to
the provenance data, but not repeat the processing steps
that produced them.

Provenance deltas. Instead of maintaining the full
provenance information in each version, we can only
record the deltas between adjacent versions. This reduces the storage cost considerably, but, when answering a query, the deltas need to be incrementally applied
to regenerate the full provenance information.

System runtime. Many distributed systems run for an
indefinite amount of time. For example, the Internet’s interdomain routing system has been running for decades.
In such systems, checkpoints are indispensable because
it is not practical for the querier to replay the execution of
the system, or even just a single node, from the very beginning. On the other hand, there are distributed systems
that run only for a limited time. For example, a MapReduce cluster might be set up to process just a small number of large jobs, and many multiplayer games only last
for a few hours. In this case, replaying the entire log may
be practical, and if so, we can save even more space by
not maintaining checkpoints at all.

Per-node input logs. If each node runs a deterministic
algorithm, we can choose not to actively maintain provenance during execution time at all. Instead, we can simply record all the inputs (such as network messages, disk
reads, etc) at each node. During a query, we can use deterministic replay to reproduce the system execution, and
we can generate provenance on the fly.
System input logs. To reduce the storage overhead even
further, we can record only the raw inputs (i.e., the base
tuples) of the entire system. If the system’s execution is
deterministic, we can replay it based on the recorded inputs and generate the provenance information as before.
This approach comes at the expense of higher querying overhead: since only the raw system-wide inputs are
recorded, we cannot independently replay a single node;
instead, we must replay the entire system execution.
To avoid replaying the deltas (or input logs) from
the very beginning of the system execution, each node
can periodically record a checkpoint of its current state.
Thus, replay can start from the latest checkpoint. To save
space, the checkpoints could be discarded after a certain
amount of time.

4.2

Local derivations. Distributed systems differ in the relative frequency of remote derivations, which involve message exchanges between nodes, and purely local derivations. When most derivations are remote, both provenance deltas and input logs should perform equally well,
since most state changes (which are recorded in provenance deltas) are due to incoming messages (which are
recorded in the input logs). However, there are systems
where most derivations are local; for example, a distributed machine-learning algorithm might just send a
very few messages to transfer the raw data and the results. In this case, input logs should consume a lot less
space than provenance deltas, but they would need a lot
more computation when the provenance graph needs to
be reconstructed to answer a query.

Tradeoffs

The maintenance approaches introduced in the previous
section offer a spectrum of tradeoffs between maintenance overhead and querying performance. The best
tradeoff depends on a variety of factors, some of which
we discuss below.

Trust. If all the nodes in the distributed system are
trusted, we can safely optimize for query performance.
However, if the system is large enough, it almost inevitably contains, at any given time, some nodes that are
faulty or have been misconfigured or compromised. In
this case, provenance deltas are risky because the querier
cannot easily see whether a given delta was recorded correctly. Input logs are safer because the querier itself regenerates the provenance. Ideally, the correctness and
completeness of the inputs in the logs would be verifiable through some other means.

Querying frequency. We expect that the cost for
query processing will be a function of 1) how frequently
queries are issued, 2) how far apart the checkpoints are
in the log, and 3) how much work is required to replay
a log segment. If queries are expected to be rare, we
can save space by maintaining input logs, and by taking
checkpoints only occasionally. In this case, answering a
query can be expensive because the relevant parts of the
provenance graph must be reconstructed by replaying the
execution of certain nodes from their latest checkpoint.
If queries are more frequent, we can trade some
space for a lower query-processing cost by 1) taking
checkpoints more frequently, which reduces the expected
length of the log segment that needs to be replayed,
and/or 2) maintaining provenance deltas rather than input

In summary, there is no clear ‘winner’ among the three
approaches we have proposed in Section 4.1; rather, the
best approach depends on the specific use case in which
TAP is applied. It would be interesting to design a provenance system that can adaptively select the best approach
at runtime – for example, based on the observed query
frequency and the workload characteristics.
4

Provenance Querying

macroquery
......
<tn, τN>

null

2z

......

logs@N2

per-vertex
query
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chkpoint
logs

per-vertex
query

t2z , τ

chkpoint
logs

t2, τ2

a

b

logs@N1

, τ2
t 2a

a

per-vertex
query

FOR [-mincost $X] <-+ [+link $Y]
WHERE $Y.time>t
INCLUDE PATH $X <-+ $Y
RETURN $X

logs@Nm

Figure 3: The multi-staged querying strategy. htx , τx i
refers to a tuple τx at a given time tx .

[-mincost $X] binds variable X to the DELETE vertices
of mincost, and [+link $Y] binds Y to the INSERT vertices of link. INCLUDE PATH $X <-+ $Y confines the
search within the subgraph between vertices X and Y. The
query returns the DELETE vertices of the mincost tuples
that are triggered by the insertion of link tuples (with

• A vertex query returns the set of vertices that are adjacent to a given vertex, as well as the corresponding
edges. Vertex queries are the basic building block of
the provenance querying. For instance, in Figure 3,
ht2a , τ2a i is the returned result for ht2 , τ2 i. Vertex
queries can be answered by replaying the provenance deltas or input logs to reproduce the relevant
parts of the provenance graph.

timestamps bigger than t).
If TAP maintains both forward and backward edges
(i.e., from causes to effects and vice versa), provenance
queries can ask for causality or effect chains, or even a
combination of both. For example, to analyze the effects of a link insertion, one iterates through all the
INSERT link vertices and follows the forward edges to
reach DELETE mincost vertices. On the other hand, to
query the cause of a deleted mincost vertex would require edge traversal in the opposite direction. We are
planning to enhance TapQL to allow users to specify either cause or effect queries.

5.1

τ2

, τ2
t 2b

t 2,

......

microquery ...... microquery

microquery

t2a, τ2a

microquery

<t2, τ2> <t3, τ3>

t2z, τ2z

Candidates <t1, τ1>

, τ2
t 2a

To query TAP’s provenance graph, a suitable query language is needed. We are currently working on TapQL,
an extension of ProQL [9] that incorporates new language primitives to enable query specifications for time
and changes. To illustrate, the following TapQL query
can be used to analyze the (transitive) effects of a link
insertion at a particular time in protocol execution:

chkpoint
logs
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5.2

Optimizations

There are several opportunities for optimizations at each
stage of our proposed querying strategy. For instance,
we can apply the following two optimizations, originally
proposed in [21], at the microquery level:

Querying Strategy

• Early query termination. During microquery evaluation, the query can be terminated early if the results are guaranteed to be in (or out of) the result
set. This is common for queries that compute monotonically increasing aggregate values with selection
predicates, e.g., a query for vertices with more than
a given number of unique derivations. In this case,
the results can be returned (or discarded) as soon as
the constraint is satisfied (or can no longer be satisfied).
• Another optimization is to cache query results, and
reuse them for answering subsequent queries. Note
that cache invalidation is not needed – as the query
results are the fact of the execution history, and thus
will not change over time.
• The overall querying performance would greatly
benefit from reducing the overhead of performing vertex queries, which is carried out by replaying provenance deltas (or input logs). Existing work [12] has proposed techniques that allow

To process TapQL queries, we propose a novel multistaged query processing strategy (shown in Figure 3),
which is specifically optimized for replays of provenance
deltas or input logs. Our proposed strategy consists of the
following three stages:
• A macroquery iterates through potential candidate
tuples, e.g., all the mincost tuples in the example query, and issues microqueries to determine the
provenance of each candidate tuple. Microqueries
can be evaluated in parallel to optimize the overall
query latency.
• A microquery performs a distributed recursive evaluation for the provenance of a single tuple. In
essence, this amounts to a recursive traversal of the
provenance graph [21] until base tuples are reached.
When a tuple satisfies the constraints in the query,
the microquery should return the provenance of that
tuple in the desired form, e.g. as a set of base tuples.
5
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One can also apply optimizations at the macroquery
level. Traditional database optimizations, such as cost
estimation of alternative query plans and heuristics,
should generally be applicable here. For instance, if a
provenance query involves tuples in multiple relations,
we can start from relations with low cardinalities.
Interestingly, we can trade query response time for
communication overhead at the macroquery level by using cached query results at the microquery level. Instead
of issuing all microqueries at once, the query processor
can choose to execute one microquery at a time, to maximize the likelihood of cache hits for subsequent queries.
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Secure Provenance Querying

So far, we have assumed that all the nodes cooperate
with the querier. However, in large distributed systems,
it is not uncommon for some of the nodes to be faulty or
compromised by an adversary. When a system contains
such compromised nodes, provenance could be useful as
a forensic tool; however, the adversary could attempt to
cover his traces by deliberately tampering with the provenance information, causing query results to be incorrect
and/or incomplete. Thus, it would be useful to have a
provenance system that can give correctness guarantees
even when it is under attack.
Not all adversaries are equally powerful. Often, adversaries only manage to compromise non-privileged software on the affected nodes. If the provenance information is extracted and maintained by a privileged component, such as the operating system kernel or a hypervisor,
it is still possible to answer queries correctly. However,
sometimes adversaries manage to compromise even privileged components, and can effectively take complete
control over the affected nodes. During such attacks, correct answers to provenance queries would be particularly
useful, but they are also particularly difficult to obtain.
We are currently working on a system that can answer
distributed provenance queries even when some nodes
have been completely compromised by an adversary. A
perfect solution to this problem is impossible: for example, if the provenance of a tuple τ is stored on a set
S of nodes, a query for the provenance of τ cannot be
answered correctly if the adversary manages to compromise all the nodes in S. However, based on ideas from
tamper-evident logging and auditing [6], it is possible to
obtain a practical system with only slightly weaker guarantees.
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